



HEALTH ECONOMICS

AN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION PERSPECTIVE

XAVIER MARTINEZ-GIRALT AND PEDRO BARROS

Health Economics

An Industrial Organization perspective

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To *sofia. Henrique and Carolina*

To *Montse. Ivette and William*

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